China’s one-party system gives it a strategic advantage in its engagement with Africa

On 20 January 2026, The Guardian reported excerpts from a leaked email written by Nick Checker, the newly appointed head of the US State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs. In it, he wrote that “Africa is a peripheral – rather than a core – theater for US interests”. This contrasts with the approach by China, which sees Africa as a core strategic partner.  

President Donald Trump’s second term has seen significant disruptions, and the drafting of policies and strategies has often been the opposite of those of his predecessors, Joe Biden and Barack Obama. Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), China is pursuing a less volatile approach. As China’s one-party state sticks to and refines its policies towards Africa, the democratic US is pursuing wildly oscillating policies depending on which party is elected.

In his second term of office, Trump has shut down the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), made moves to shut down the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), left the future of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in doubt, and implemented visa restrictions to multiple African countries.

Under Xi’s rule, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) has continued its triennial meetings. The 2024 FOCAC summit, held in Beijing, unveiled the ten-partnership initiatives, aimed at advancing modernisation between China and Africa. China has been steadfast in its stance on Africa as a strategic partner. Xi became president in 2013, and the abolition of the two-term limit for the president in 2018 means that this approach is likely to continue.

The one-party state advantage

The developmental goals, investments, trade opportunities, and the quest for soft power that underlie China’s engagement with Africa are not short-term pursuits. They are sustained by consistent, long-term engagement rather than episodic, volatile initiatives.

China’s political structure is better equipped to operate on that timeline. Beijing is not subject to democratic electoral turnover and is therefore less prone to routinely reinventing its foreign policy priorities. China’s current political system allows it to easily align ministries, policy banks, and state-owned enterprises with its foreign policy objectives.

Even when Beijing recalibrates, the overarching direction remains broadly consistent: keep the engagement, expand the economic footprint, and consolidate influence. As a result of China’s consistency, it has remained Africa’s largest trading partner since 2009 and is now the continent’s largest bilateral lender. Beijing’s commitment to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has led to construction contracts worth £46 billion in 2025.

China’s continuity is producing a cumulative effect. Chinese firms, including private ones, are playing important roles in China’s foreign engagement and are increasingly embedded in local African economies, strengthening ties. The triennial FOCAC summits, high-level visits, and the biennial China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo, together reinforce a sense of permanence. There is now a 36-year-long tradition of the Chinese foreign minister’s first overseas trip of the year being to Africa. African leaders may have mixed views about Chinese engagement, but there can be little doubt: China will still be there next year, and the year after that, for continued engagement.

The political fragility of the US

For decades, the United States has had significant engagements with Africa and remains a major partner on multiple fronts. Yet, despite US-Africa engagement dating back several years, it has been erratic in the last two decades. US investments in Africa soared from approximately £1.65bn in 2003 to £6.65bn in 2009, then declined in subsequent years. In 2022, US investments in Africa (£1.75bn) exceeded Chinese investment (£1.47bn) for the first time since 2012, and maintained its growing trajectory in 2023, with investments worth £4.25bn, before falling drastically to negative £1.58bn in 2024.

Current diplomatic relations between African countries and the US have become significantly strained. Trump’s visa ban, the shutdown of state agencies such as USAID, and the realignment of policies such as AGOA have disrupted economic ties. His boycott of the G20 summit hosted by South Africa in 2025 and his threats not to invite South Africa to the 2026 edition hosted by the US are emblematic of the volatile nature of US ties under the current administration.

Presidential transitions routinely reshape the framing of Africa in US strategy. During Obama’s administration, the US Strategy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa, released in 2012, highlighted four pillars of engagement: (1) Strengthen democratic institutions, (2) Spur economic growth, trade, and investment, (3) Advance peace and security, and (4) Promote opportunity and development.

Six years later, during Trump’s first term in office, the strategy encompassed three main agendas. The first was to advance US trade and commercial ties with African countries to the benefit of both the United States and Africa. Secondly, to counter the threat from Radical Islamic Terrorism and violent conflict, and finally, to ensure that US taxpayer dollars for aid are used efficiently and effectively.

In 2022, Biden’s government focused on the following objectives: (1) Foster openness and open societies, (2) Deliver democratic and security dividends, (3) Advance pandemic recovery and economic opportunity, (4) Support conservation, climate adaptation, and a just energy transition.

During his tenure, Obama visited seven African countries (Ghana, Egypt, Senegal, Ethiopia, South Africa, Kenya, and Tanzania) and held the first US-Africa Leaders Summit featuring over 50 African leaders. Trump never visited any African country, nor did he host the US-Africa Leaders Summit that Obama had initiated. Upon taking office, Biden hosted the second US-Africa Leaders Summit, featuring 49 African leaders, and visited 2 African countries (Angola and Cape Verde). In July 2025, Trump hosted a mini-summit at the White House, where he met African leaders from Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, and Senegal.

Engagement between the US and Africa has therefore been more volatile than China’s during Xi’s tenure. China has consistently prioritised its predictable summits with African leaders, high-level visits to the continent, and constantly stressed the need for partnership with Africa. Trump has yet to set foot on African soil, though Xi has done that multiple times.

The US democratic system is a source of legitimacy and accountability. But it comes with inherent uncertainties in foreign policy since elections reorder priorities. American voters are unlikely to consider presidential aspirants' policies toward Africa when voting. Hence, the priority of US-Africa relations depends on the elected government’s political incentives. As a result, partisanship disrupts continuity and congressional dynamics, and polarisation can inject uncertainty into long-term commitments. US-Africa engagements have therefore been pendulous over the years, and in hedging against this volatility, African governments look to China as an important, less-volatile partner.

The one-party state of China has leveraged its political system to pursue a less volatile engagement with Africa and, as a result, has chalked up continuously rising influence and a growing footprint on the African continent. On the other hand, the US’s democratic system makes its engagements with Africa more volatile, as policies and priorities change depending on who occupies the White House.

This write-up has been published by Africa at LSE